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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In their opening brief, the Lawrences do not discuss or contest the majority of the facts
found by the trial court in its Memorandum Decision and Order. Spectra Site incorporates the
Course of Proceedings set forth by the Lawrences but adds clarifications to the outcome of trial
and the final and amended final judgments entered by the district court. For ease of reading,
Spectra Site's Statement of the Facts generally follows the same structure as the trial court's
Memorandum Decision and Order. Aug.RP. 81-106. Only those findings of facts contested by
the La\vrences are supported by full citations to the evidence in the record. This response brief
also contains depictions of the prope1iies as required in I.AR. 35(g).

Course ofProceedings
A six day bench trial was held on the bifurcated easement use issue, concluding on June
18, 2013. Aug.RP. 83. A jury trial was held on the contract issue, concluding November 7,
2014 with a special verdict entered in favor of Spectra Site. Aug. R P. 30-31. The district court
entered final judgment on February 17, 2015. Aug.RP. 32-37. The district court then entered an
amended final judgment on May 21, 2015. Aug.RP. 38-43. Both the final judgment and the
amended final judgment granted Spectra Site a permanent injunction against the Lawrences,
enjoining them from interfering with, impeding, or preventing Spectra Site Communications,
Inc. from using or maintaining Blossom Mountain Road as it crosses their property.RP. 32-43.
The amended final judgment did not grant Spectra Site or Hall an easement and did not quiet title
in favor of Hall.RP. 32-43.

Statement o(the Facts
A. The Location of the Respective Parcels

1

The Lawrences do not challenge the trial court's finding that all the land encompassed in
this case is located in Township 50 North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County,
Idaho. Aug.RP. 84. The Lawrences do not contest the trial court's finding that in 1969 Harold
and Marlene Funk acquired a large parcel of property, which included property situated in
Sections 15, 21 and 22. Aug.RP. 84. The Funk property ownership is outlined in red below as
depicted in Trial Exhibit 57.
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2

The Lawrences do not challenge Hall is the current owner of real property previously
owned by Funk in the southwest quarter of Section 22, Township 50 North, Range 5 West, Boise
Meridian, in Kootenai County south of Post Falls and the Spokane River. Aug.RP. 84.
Lawrences do not challenge Spectra Site is a lessee of a portion of the Hall parcel. Aug. RP. 84.
The Lawrences do not find error with the trial court's finding they are owners of a parcel of land
previously owned by Funk located west of Hall's parcel in a portion of the southeast quarter of
Section 21. Aug.RP. 84. No challenge is made to the trial court's finding that these properties
are either directly or tangentially located near "Blossom Mountain" which is approximately two
miles as the crow flies from the City of Post Falls, Idaho. Aug.RP. 85. The Lawrence prope1iy
lies adjacent to a subdivision known as Blossom Mountain Estates. Trial Exhibit 40. Blossom
Mountain States is a subdivision of the Southwest Quarter of Section 22. Id. Blossom Mountain
Road is designated as "Apple Blossom Road" and identified as the primary access road to the 14
platted lots. Trial Exhibit 40. The Hall parcel sits toward the center of the subdivided lots.
Trial Exhibit 40.
B. Access and Chain of Title
The Lawrences agree with the Court's finding that the property in Section 21 and 22 is
accessed by a private easement road which connects to a public road known as Signal Point
Road. Aug.RP. 84. The Lawrences do not claim error with the trial court's finding there is no
evidence that any real property owner or lessee in Section 21 or Section 22 used any other road
than Blossom Mountain Road to access their real estate. Aug.RP. 84. The Lawrences agree
that the private easement road has been referred to as Blossom Mountain Road, West Blossom
Road, or Ski Hill Road. Aug.RP. 84. It was also identified as "Apple Blossom Road" in the
Blossom Mountain subdivision plat and a road survey of a portion of the road. Trial Exhibits 40
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. The Lawrences contest on appeal the trial court's finding that Signal Point Road was the
only public road providing access to Funk's parcel. The diagram below, derived from Trial
Exhibits 24, 41 and 50, generally depict the access roads and parcels.
Hall/Spectra
Site
§ 21
Lawrence

Capstar

1. The Funk Property
Lmvrences do not contest the trial court's finding that in 1969, Harold and Marlene Funk
entered into a real estate contract to purchase Government Lot 3 in Section 15; the Southeast
Quarter of Section 21; Government Lot 4 in Section 22; and the southwest quarter of the
northwest quarter of Section 22, and the southwest quarter of Section 22. Aug. R P. 85; Trial
Exhibit 3. This sale did not include an acre parcel in Section 22 that was sold to GTC in 1966.
Aug.RP. 85; Trial Exhibit 3.
The Lmvrences agree with the trial court's finding that on November 7, 1972, Wilber and
Florence Mead and Ethel Blossom conveyed an easement for ingress and egress across the
Blossom/Meads' real property in Section 21 for the benefit of all the land the Funks were
purchasing. Aug.RP. 85.
Following the Funks' purchase in 1969, Harold Funk used Blossom Mountain Road 2030 times to access Section 22 between 1969 and 1975. Tr P. 323, L. 1-9; Trial Exhibit WW, P.
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25, L. 11-23. Blossom Mountain Road provided Funks the sole access to their property in
Section 22. Tr P. 46, L. 18

P. 47, L. 7; P. 58, L.8

P. 59, L. 1; P. 60, L. 2-11; P. 126, L. 1 - P.

127, L. 9; P. 139, L. 13-25; P. 187, L. 8-22; P. 257, L. 11-19; P. 295, L. 6-14; P. 297, L. 3-11; P.
316, L. 1-13; P. 323, L. 11-15; P. 349, L. 22- P. 351, L. 13; P. 352, L. 20-25; P. 479, L. 19

P.

481, L. 6; P. 506, L. 20-25; P. 524, L. 5-22; P. 528, L. 1-14; P. 530, L. 20-P. 531, L. 6; P. 540,
L. 1-20; P. 595, L. 24 - P. 597, L. 22; P. 636, L. 17 -P. 638, L. 8; P. 647, L. 1-4; P. 663, L. 5 P. 666, L. 11; P. 697, L. 1

P. 698, L. 11; P. 707, L. 20 - P. 708, L. 4; P. 754, L. 17-25; Trial

Exhibit WW, P. 25, L. 24-P. 26, L. 4.
The Lawrences do not dispute the trial court's findings that the Funks decided to sell the
bulk of their real property to a company named Human Synergistics in 1975. Aug.RP. 85. The
Lawrences agree on July 10, 1975, seven sale agreements were recorded which reflected the
contracts for sale of separate parcels of all of the Funks real property in Section 21 and Section
15 as well as most of the real property in Section 22, except for the Southwest quarter of Section
22. Aug.RP. 86.
The Lawrences do not dispute on appeal the trial court's finding that each of the seven
contracts included the following language:
5. Subject to and including an ingress egress easement over this and adjoining
property, is said Sections 21 and 22 owned by the grantor and including an
ingress egress easement over po1iions of Section 21 heretofore granted to the
grantors. Said easement shall be over existing roads until such time as all record
owners shall agree to the relocation, improvement and/or abandonment of all or
any portions of any roads. This easement is also over similar lands in Section 15.
AR. P. 86, Trial Exhibits 5-11 at ,r 5.
The trial court also drew the inference from the lack of evidence of any fulfillment deeds
that none were executed at the time the agreements were signed. Aug. R P. 86. Lawrences
challenge this inference on appeal as being unreasonable.
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Following the execution of the purchase and sale agreements, Funk continued to access
his property in Section 22 via Blossom Mountain Road. Tr P. 326, L. 10 - P. 328, L. 2; Trial
Exhibit WW, P. 28, L. 4 - P. 31, L. 11. The Fun._lcs never returned to the property after 1981. Tr
P. 325, L. 9-P. 328, L. 2; Trial Exhibit WW, P. 31 L. 8-17.
The Lawrences do not challenge the trial court's finding that in 1986, Harold Funk
applied for a conditional use permit from Kootenai County to install and operate an F .M.
broadcast transmitter and tower facility for radio station KCDA. Aug. RP. 86; Trial Exhibit 59.
Lawrences do not contest the listed access was by means of Signal Point Road. Trial Exhibit 59.
Lawrences do not contest that the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners approved the
conditional use permit and found that the proposed tower would be 280 feet tall and that the legal
requirements for notification of adjacent property O\Vners had been made for the proposed use of
Funk's segregated five acre parcel. Trial Exhibit 59. Lawrences do not contest the trial court's
finding that in 1988, Funk requested another conditional use permit to build a 40-foot tower for
microwave and cable television, listing the direction to the site as using Signal Point Road and
then traveling over the gravel dirt road (Blossom Mountain Road). Aug.RP. 86. Lawrences do
not contest the trial court's finding that the site was a 50 feet by 200 feet site bordering the
existing GTC site. Aug. R P. 86, Trial Exhibit 60. Lawrences do not contest the trial court's
finding that the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners commented that access was by means
of a private road off Signal Point Road and that the legal requirements for notice to the adjacent
property owners was satisfied, and the demand for conditional use permits for Kootenai County
microwave towers had increased substantially. Aug.RP. 86-87. Funk's tower tenants continued
to access Section 22 via Blossom Mountain Road. Tr. P. 145, L. 12 -P. 153, L. 4.
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Lawrences do not attack the trial court's finding that more than 17 years after the sales
agreement with Human Synergistics were signed, on October 22, 1992, the Funks sold their
remaining interest in the southwest qumier of Section 22 to John Mack.

Aug. R P. 87.

Lavvrences express no disagreement with the trial court's finding that on October 29, 1992, the
Funks signed a wmranty deed in fulfillment of their contract and conveyed the southeast quarter
of Section 21 to Human Synergistics. Aug. RP. 87. Lawrences do not claim error in the trial
court's finding that Funk's deed to Human Synergistics failed to reserve or except an easement
for the benefit of the Funks, their successors, or assigns to provide access to the remaining
property in Section 22. Aug. RP. 87. Lawrences dispute the trial court's findings that all of the
real property owned by the Funks, their successors, or assigns located in the southwest quarter of
Section 22 was landlocked with no recorded easement upon execution of the deed from Funks to
Human Synergistics in 1992. Aug.RP. 87.
The Lawrences do not address the trial court's finding that on September 20, 1996,
Arman and Mary Jane Farmanian entered into a "Mutual Agreement Grant of Easement and Quit
Claim Deed" with John W. Mack. Aug.RP. 87; Trial Exhibit 23. Lawrences do not dispute on
appeal that the language in the agreement states: "AND WHEREAS, MACK and MACK'S
predecessors in interest have used a preexisting private road traversing the most southeasterly
portion of the FARMANIAN PROPERTY to gain access to the Mack property. This private
road is sometimes known as Blossom Mountain Road (hereinafter referred to as the 'ACCESS
ROAD."' Aug. RP. 87, Trial Exhibit 23. This road was recognized as the historical access of
Mack's predecessors in the agreement. Trial Exhibit 23.
The Lawrences do not dispute that on October 8, 1997, an agreement was executed
between Idaho Forest Industries (a predecessor in interest to the current owner of that portion of
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Section 28 that the access road passes through) and Nextel West (the predecessor in interest to
Spectra Site) to allow Nextel West access across Section 28. Aug. RP. 87. The Lawrences do
not dispute the trial court's finding that Spectra Site is an assignee or successor in interest of
Nextel West with respect to that access agreement. Aug.RP. 87.
2. The Lawrence Property
On appeal, the Lawrences do not contest the trial court's finding they reviewed and
signed a preliminary title commitment. Aug. RP. 88. They do not contest this preliminary title
commitment provided them notice there were at least three claimed ingress/egress easements
across the real property they were purchasing. Aug. RP. 88. The Lawrences to not contest the
trial court's finding that Doug Lawrence's testimony established he was aware of a private road
on the property before buying it. Aug. RP. 88. The Lawrences do not dispute the trial court's
finding that Doug Lawrence knew the access road he used did not stop at his property's eastern
boundary. Aug. RP. 88. Lawrences do dispute the trial court's finding that at the time the real
property was conveyed that eventually came into possession of Spectra Site's landlord, Hall, it
was landlocked and had no recorded easement. Aug.RP. 88.
3. Chain of title.
The chain of title on appeal was not disputed by Lawrence for either parcel.
C. Mellick Road
Lawrences contest the trial court's finding that Mellick Road in Section 15 did not
provide access to Funks at the time of severance of the parcels. Aug. R P. 89. In the body of its
argument Spectra Site will address the evidence that supports the trial court's findings.
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ARGUMENT
Spectra Site's arrangement of the argument section of its brief will vary from that
of Lawrence because the last issue discussed by the Lmvrences, the standing issue, is best
addressed at the begim1ing of the argument since it informs the analysis of the remaining
issues and clarifies exactly what ruling was made by the district court.

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The burden of proof rests upon the paiiy asse1iing an implied easement to show the
existence of facts necessary to create by implication an easement. Trunnell v. Ward, 86 Idaho
555,560,389 P.2d 221,224 (1964). This Court reviews factual findings made after a trial
without a jury for clear error. A1achado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212, 217, 280 P.3d 715, 720 (2012).
Findings of fact will not be disturbed if they are supported by substantial and competent
evidence, even if there is conflicting evidence. Id. "Substantial evidence is that which a
reasonable trier of fact would accept and rely upon it in determining findings of fact." Id. This
Court freely reviews the district court's conclusions oflaw. Id. This Court gives due regard to
the district court's special opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses who personally
appear before the comi. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 479-80, 12 P.3d 1223, 1228-29
(2006).

II.

SPECTRA SITE HAD STANDING TO SEEK INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

The district court did not err when it granted injunctive relief to Spectra Site. As a lessee
of Hall, Spectra Site has standing to seek injunctive relief to prevent Lawrence from interfering
with its right to use Blossom Mountain Road. This Court has already addressed whether Hall's
tenants have standing to enforce their right to use Blossom Mountain Road. In Tower Asset Sub
Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 713, 152 P.3d 581, 584 (2007), this Court adopted the
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Restatement (Third) of Property and declared "an individual has standing to enforce the right to
use an easement ifhe or she has the right to benefit from the easement." 1 Based on the adoption
of the restatement, this Court concluded "title ownership of the dominant estate is not a
necessary prerequisite to obtain standing to enforce the right to use an easement." Id. Applying
that law to this very case this Court held that Tower Asset Sub Inc., Halls tenant prior to Spectra
Site, has standing to seek injunctive relief:
Hall, who is not a party to this suit, is the record owner of the alleged dominant
estate. As a result, Tower lacks standing to seek a quiet title declaration in its
favor. However, since standing to enforce the right to use an easement is
consistent with the right to benefit from the easement, Tower will have standing
to seek injunctive relief if it can establish it has an alleged legal right to benefit
from the Blossom Mountain Road easement. As lessee of the alleged dominant
estate, Tower derives its right to use the alleged easement from its lessor, Hall.
We hold that Tower, as lessee of the alleged dominant estate, has
standing to seek injunctive relief preventing the Lawrences from interfering
with its alleged right to use the easement, but lacks standing to seek to quiet
title to the easement.

Tower Asset Sub, 143 Idaho at 713, 152 P.3d at 584 (emphasis added). According to the Tower
Asset Sub decision, this Court has already ruled that Hall's tenants have standing to seek
injunctive relief.
Appeal to this Court can be made from a final judgment. I.A.R. 11. Lawrences rely upon
statements in a memorandum decision and order to support their position the trial court granted
quiet title to Spectra Site. A memorandum decision and order is not an appealable final
judgment. In this case, the final judgment from which appeal can be made is the Amended Final
Judgment entered May 21, 2015. RP. 38-43. The Amended Final Judgment is consistent with
the limitations placed on Spectra Site's standing by the Tower Asset Sub decision because it only
1 The restatement reads as follows: "A person who holds the benefit of a servitude under any provision of this
Restatement has a legal right to enforce the servitude. Ownership of land intended to benefit from enforcement of
the servitude is not a prerequisite to enforcement, but a person who holds the benefit of a covenant in gross must
establish a legitimate interest in enforcing the covenant." Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 8.1 (2000).
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grants Spectra Site injunctive relief and does not quiet title.RP. 38-43. The Lawrences argue to
this Court that the district court somehow established the existence of an easement impermissibly
because Hall was not a party to the action. Appellant's Brief at 16. However, the Amended Final
Judgment does not quiet title to Hall.
The district court's Memorandum Decision and Order made a determination that Hall had
vested easement rights over Lawrence's property based on an implied easement by prior use and
an implied easement by necessity. Aug.RP. 100, 104. This was a preliminary detennination
necessary to adjudicate the rights of Spectra Site as Hall's tenant. As discussed specifically
below, Spectra Site presented the district court with sufficient evidence to establish Hall's vested
right to use Blossom Mountain Road over Lawrence's property. Based on that preliminary
determination, the district comi was able to determine Spectra Site's entitlement to a permanent
injunction. Aug. R P. 104-105, R P. 3 8-4 3. Accordingly, the district comi did not en in finding
that Spectra Site has standing to seek injunctive relief.

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SPECTRA SITE
AN INJUNCTION BASED UPON HALL'S IMPLIED EASEMENT FROM
PRIOR USE

The Lawrences incorrectly argue on appeal that the district court granted Spectra Site an
easement. The amended final judgment in this case did not quiet title in favor of Spectra Site for
an implied easement from prior use. The district court's analysis was a preliminary
determination of Hall's right to an implied easement so the district court could enforce Spectra
Site's rights as a tenant or lessee. The district court correctly found that Spectra Site proved the
facts required to establish an implied easement by prior use in favor of Hall: "Spectra Site proved
that it [Hall] is entitled to an implied easement across the existing road on the Lawrences' real
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property in Section 21." 2 Aug.RP. 100. The wording in the memorandum decision and order is
not as precise as it could be with regard to the easement and the fact that an easement was not
being granted, but only preliminarily analyzed. However, the result is the same because there is
no grant of easement or quiet title in the amended final judgment.RP. 38-43. Nevertheless, the
district court's preliminary determination that Hall was entitled to an implied easement is
supp01ied by substantial and competent evidence.
Lawrences contend the district court erred in finding an implied easement because it
misapplied the elements established by this Court for an implied easement. An implied easement
is "based on the theory that when someone conveys property, they also intend to convey
whatever is required for the beneficial use and enjoyment of that property, and intends to retain
all that is required for the use and enjoyment of the land retained." Bird v. Bidwell, 14 7 Idaho
350, 352, 209 P.3d 647, 649 (2009). This Court has set forth the elements necessary to prove an
implied easement as follows:
In order to prove the existence of an implied easement by prior use, a party must
show: (1) unity of title or ownership and subsequent separation by grant of the
dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the
dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent; and (3) that
the easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the
dominant estate.

Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 45,205 P.3d 1175, 1181 (2009)(Akers II). It is undisputed
that Spectra Site proved the existence of the first element, unity of title. Appellant's Brief at 6;
Aug.RP. 99. The district court's findings that Spectra Site proved the remaining elements are
supported by substantial and competent evidence.

2 Hereinafter all mention of an "implied easement" will refer to an implied easement by prior use unless specifically
noted otherwise.
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The District Court's Finding that Funk Intended to Reserve an Easement is
Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence
Lawrences claim the trial court's finding that Funk intended to reserve an easement
across the Lawrences parcel at the time the legal title was severed from the equitable title is not
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Lawrences contend Akers II stands for the
proposition that the only method of proving intent to reserve an easement is by evidence of
apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant estate to show the use
was intended to be permanent. Lawrences argue on appeal that a trial court may not consider
evidence of actual intent expressed in a sales agreement in its analysis of the grantor's intent to
reserve an easement. Lawrences ask this Court on appeal to rigidly apply the second element in
Akers II to exclude consideration of Funks' actual express intent to reserve an easement, and

focus only upon actual use of the easement by Funk prior to separation. Lawrences conclude if
the trial court is restricted to considering only the evidence of use prior to separation there was
not substantial and competent evidence to support the trial court's finding that Funks intended to
reserve an easement across Lawrences parcel at the time title was separated.
The district court concluded as a matter of law it could consider evidence of the actual
intent of the grantor in determining whether the grantor intended to reserve an easement. The
district court relied upon Schultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773-74, 554 P.2d 948, 951-52 (1976),
which held that an easement may be implied in one of three ways: (1) presumed based on the
circumstances existing before the separation; (2) implied by public policy; or (3) inferred often
fictitiously through long continuous use of the easement. Aug. RP. 94. The district court also
recognized that Bird case recognized that a necessary consideration related to the second element
vvas the intent of the grantor at the time the dominant estate was separated. 147 Idaho at 352, 209
P.3d at 649. The district court also recognized intent to grant or reserve the easement was a
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necessary element to an implied easement in Bird holding that there was no logical reason to
base the decision solely upon the grantor's presumed intent from prior use and exclude other
relevant evidence of that intent. Id Based upon these case holdings, the district court concluded
as a matter of law it was permissible to consider evidence of the actual intent of the parties at the
time of separation of the parcels.
The second element for an implied easement by prior use as articulated in Akers II serves
two purposes: First, it is a means of establishing the intent of the grantor at the time the dominant
estate is separated. Bird, 147 Idaho at 352, 209 P.3d at 649. Second, it is designed to "ensure[]
that the buyer of the servient property will have notice of the preexisting use." Davis v. Peacock,
133 Idaho 637,641,991 P.2d 362,366 (1999) overruled on other grounds by Spokane
Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 226 P.3d 1263 (2010). If the servient
owner has notice of the preexisting use, it is then equitable to impose an easement on that buyer
if that is what the grantor intended. Id. Thus, as long as evidence is presented that satisfies those
two purposes (evidence of grant or intent and servient estate's knowledge of preexisting use) the
second element as articulated in Akers II is satisfied.
The district court correctly found substantial and competent evidence presented at trial
evidencing Funk's intent to reserve an easement and Human Synergistics' knowledge of the use
of that road. The real estate sales agreements signed by Funk and Human Synergistics evidence
that Funk intended to reserve an easement corresponding with Blossom Mountain Road and that
Human Synergistics knew of that easement road. Trial Exhibits 5-11. Each of those seven sales
agreements included the following language:
5. Subject to and including an ingress and egress easement over this and
adjoining property, in Said Sections 21 and 22 owned by the grantor and
including an ingress egress easement over portions of Section 21 heretofore
granted to the grantors. Said easement shall be over existing roads until such time
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as all record owners shall agree to the relocation, improvement and/or
abandonment of all or any p01iions of any roads. This easement is also over
similar lands in Section 15.
Trial Exhibits 5-11 at~ 5. Each sales agreement was signed by Funk and Human Synergistics.
The evidence presented at trial is that this easement was Blossom Mountain Road. Tr P. 312, LL
20-23; P. 316, LL 1-13; P. 323, LL 11-15; P. 351, LL 1-10; P. 352, LL 20-25.
The sales agreements presented at trial are substantial and competent evidence that 1)
Funk intended to reserve an easement, and 2) Human Synergistics knew about Funk's use of the
easement road.
The Lawrences claim that even if the trial court could consider such evidence, the
evidence before it was not substantial and competent. Despite the express language in the sales
agreement, Lawrences claim the only reasonable inference that can be drawn given the lack of a
reservation in the warranty deed delivered to Human Synergistics 17 years later is that Funk did
not intend to reserve an easement in 1975 at the time of severance.
Harold Funk suffered a major illness (cancer) which he testified impacted his memory.
Trial Exhibit WW, P. 23, L 14-17; P. 31, L. 8-13, P. 35, LL 10-15. Given the express language
of the sales agreement in 1975, the existence of the access road and its use for ingress and egress
at the time of severance, Funk's subsequent references in the 1980 's to its use in support of his
two conditional use permits, the continued use of the access road by Funk's tenants, the lapse of
time between the sales agreement and the execution of the warranty deed, and Funk's illness
which affected his memory, the trial court's inference was reasonable and was based upon
substantial and competent evidence.
In Donaldson v. Thousand Springs Power Co., 29 Idaho 735, 747, 162 P. 334, 388
(1916), our Supreme Court held t where real estate is agreed to be conveyed by an executory
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contract of sale

reservation, the equitable title passes at once to the vendee. (Emphasis

added). However, in Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 540, 681 P.2d 1010, 1015
(Ct.App.1984), the Comi of Appeals recognized that the sale agreement could address access to
a parcel, and could impose access as a requirement in the sale agreement. The trial court's
inference is further supported by recognition that the sales agreements intended to reserve access
and the right was lost by operation of the doctrine of merger, and not by affirmative action by
Funks to release the reservation.
Lawrences also claim there was no substantial and competent evidence for the trial court
to find that Human Synergistics knew of the intent to reserve an easement at the time the sales
agreement was executed. Lawrences claim since Human Synergistics did not testify at trial, the
trial comi was prohibited from drawing any inferences regarding its knowledge at the time it
executed the sales agreements. This argument is specious. The trial court had before it executed
sales agreements, signed by Human Synergistics, the express terms of which proved it knew
about the term at the time of the sale that Funks intended to reserve an easement. Trial Exhibits
5-11 at, 5. Thus, the trial court's finding was based upon substantial and competent evidence.
Even if this Court determines that the district court erred in finding that the purchase and
sales agreements satisfied the second element for an implied easement, there is also substantial
and competent evidence of apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the
dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent. "The time that is legally
relevant to the question of 'apparent continuous use' is the time the dominant and servient estates
were severed." Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 302, 127 P.3d 196, 205 (2005)
(Akers I). In the case of real property sold by a sales contract, with subsequent conveyance of

legal title upon complete payment, separation of the dominant estate occurs at the time of
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execution of the sales contract because that is when a possessory interest is created. Capstar
Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411,417,283 P.3d 728, 734 (2012) (Capstar III).

The requirement of apparent continuous use has been satisfied by "farming use ...
consistent with the nature of the property" which was as infrequent as six times a year. Akers I,
142 Idaho at 302, 127 P.3d at 205. The reason apparent continuous use is required is to "show
that the use was intended to be permanent." Davis, 133 Idaho at 642, 991 P.2d at 367. Thus, this
Court has held that use can be apparent when viewing the property would provide evidence that a
road provides access to neighboring land. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 638, 132 P.3d 392,
395 (2006). For instance, in Thomas, even though there was evidence that Thomas used his
driveway about twice a day, this Court agreed with the district court that Thomas' use of the
driveway was apparent simply by viewing the property: "It is obvious to anyone going on the
property of Madsen that the driveway provides access to the red brick house and Thomas' feed
yard, stack yard, outbuildings and field." Id.

Seasonal use consistent with the nature of the

property can be considered continuous for purposes of the analysis of an implied easement.
Similarly, use that is evident and obvious from the land itself is use that is apparent.

The

seasonal use combined with the apparent use of the access road to the neighboring property
owned by Funk demonstrate Funks' use was intended to be permanent at severance as required
by Davis.
The district court had substantial and competent evidence of apparent and continuous use
of the easement road by Funk consistent with the nature of the property at the time the dominant
and servient estates were severed. The dominant estate was severed in 1975 by execution of the
purchase and sale agreements. Trial Exhibits 5-11.

Harold Funk testified that he used the

easement road 20-30 times from 1968 to 1975. Tr P. 323, L. 1-9; Exhibit WW, P. 25, L. 15-23.
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The nature of the use was for huckleberry picking and target shooting. Tr P. 323, L 1-9; Exhibit
WW, P. 25, L. 15-23. This use was consistent with the nature of the undeveloped land. There
was testimony that Blossom Mountain Road visibly extended from Lot 21 to Lot 22, making it
apparent that the road provided access to Lot 22. Tr P. 266, L. 23 - P. 267, L. 4. While Funk's
use of the road before severance was not extremely frequent, it was for a long enough period to
show that the use was intended to be pe1manent.
The testimony and exhibits presented at trial provided the district corni substantial and
competent evidence to find that the second element for an implied easement was established by
Spectra Site. Whether by the evidence of actual intent of the Funks to retain an easement and
Human Synergistics' knowledge of that easement use, or whether by evidence of apparent and
continuous use of the easement road at the time of severance, or a combination of both, the
district court had evidence to find intent to reserve an easement. Accordingly, the district court's
determination that the evidence provided by Spectra Site satisfied the second element for an
implied easement is supported by substantial and competent evidence.
B.

The District Court's Finding that Funk had Reasonable Necessity for an
Easement is Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence

The district court's determination that the easement across Lawrence's property was
reasonably necessary is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Reasonable necessity
is not the same as strict necessity. Thomas, 142 Idaho at 638, 132 P.3d at 395. A landlocked
dominant estate will always satisfy the requirement of reasonable necessity, but in the context of
an implied easement by prior use, "there is no requirement that the dominant estate be
landlocked. Id; Davis, 133 Idaho at 637,991 P.2d at 362.
Reasonable necessity is determined based upon the circumstances that existed at that time
of severance. Thomas, 142 Idaho at 638, 132 P.3d at 395. A later change in circumstances is not
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relevant to the creation of the easement. Id. In determining whether there is reasonable necessity
the Court is to consider the facts and circumstances at the time of severance, including the
convenience, inconvenience, and cost of obtaining an alternative access. Id.
An example of the standard ofreasonable necessity is the case of Davis v. Peacock. In
Davis the Comi was presented with an argument that reasonable necessity was absent because
the Russell residence was not landlocked and that the use of the disputed road was neither
necessary, nor provided the only usable means of access to the residence. 133 Idaho at 643, 991
P.2d at 368. The Court responded that this argument would be persuasive if strict necessity was
required, but not when reasonable necessity was required. Id. The Davis Court noted that at the
time of severance, the only means of access to the residence was the disputed road. Id. In fact,
regarding an argument that another street could provide access with some further development,
the Court noted that at all relevant times, Grove Street was "undeveloped and unopened, and
therefore did not provide usable access to the residence on the Russell property." Id. (emphasis
added). Based on Davis, reasonable necessity can be found even if the parcel before severance
contains undeveloped and unopened roads that could have been developed before the severance
to prevent the need for an easement after severance.
In this case, the district court's finding ofreasonable necessity for the easement across
Lawrences' property at the time of severance was supported by substantial and competent
evidence. At trial there was overwhelming evidence presented that in 1975 the tower sites,
including the Spectra Site parcel, were only accessible by Blossom Mountain Road and
otherwise landlocked. 3 Tr P. 185, L. 4-P. 186, L.13; P. 188, L. 20-P. 189, L. 2; P. 46, L. 18P. 47, L. 7; P. 58, L.8 -P. 59, L. 1; P. 60, L. 2-11; P. 126, L. 1-P. 127, L. 9; P. 139, L. 13-25;

3 There was also substantial testimony that even at times after 1975 the only access to the Spectra Site parcel was by
Blossom Mountain Road via Signal Point Road.
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P. 187, L. 8-22; P. 257, L. 11-19; P. 295, L. 6-14; P. 297, L. 3-11; P. 316, L. 1-13; P. 323, L. 1115; P. 349, L. 22 - P. 351, L. 13; P. 352, L. 20-25; P. 479, L. 19 - P. 481, L. 6; P. 506, L. 20-25;
P. 524, L. 5-22; P. 528, L. 1-14; P. 530, L. 20 - P. 531, L. 6; P. 540, L. 1-20; P. 595, L. 24 - P.
597, L. 22; P. 636, L. 17 -P. 638, L. 8; P. 647, L. 1-4; P. 663, L. 5 - P. 666, L. 11; P. 697, L. 1 -

P. 698, L. 11; P. 707, L. 20-P. 708, L. 4; P. 754, L. 17-25. Testimony was even presented of
the difficulty of accessing Blossom Mountain by helicopter. Tr P. 558, L. 13-20.
Despite the overwhelming evidence that Blossom Mountain could only be accessed from
Blossom Mountain Road, Doug Lawrence testified that he had once accessed Blossom Mountain
in 1996 or 1997 through logging roads extending from Mellick Road and reaching the north face
of Blossom Mountain. Tr P. 167, L. 21 -P. 167, L. 12. This testimony is unpersuasive for two
reasons: First, this testimony does not prove alternate access at the time Funks severed their
property. Second, Lawrence's testimony was not credible or trustworthy.
Doug Lawrence was unable to show the Court the route he claimed to have traveled. Tr
P. 167, L. 21 - 3; P. 279, L. 3-16. Furthermore, Lawrence's claim was inconsistent with his
prior representations. For instance, in opposition to a conditional use permit for North American
Cellular related to operations on Blossom Mountain, Lawrence represented to Kootenai County
that the only access to the tower sites was by Signal Point Road and Blossom Mountain Road. Tr
P. 138, L. 21 -P. 140, L. 1; Trial Exhibit 77. Lawrence never represented to the county that the
tower sites could be accessed from Mellick Road. Lawrence consistently asserted that the only
access to the tower sites was over his property via Blossom Mountain Road. Tr P. 187, L. 2-17;
P. 257, L.11-19; P. 267, L. 7-23.
The district court recognized the inconsistencies in Lawrence's testimony and rightfully
discounted it:
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Mr. Lawrence's testimony at trial was impeached by his previous testimony as
well as by admitted exhibits. The bias shown by the way he testified was
transparent. Mr. Lawrence was not a particularly credible witness.
Aug. RP. 89.
The district court was presented with a large amount of credible evidence that there was
no access via Mellick Road in 1975. For instance, Darius Ruen, a civil engineer specializing in
roadways and highways, with 32 years of experience working with the Post Falls Highway
District, testified there was no evidence of a road connected to Mellick Road providing access to
Funk's property or to Blossom Mountain until 2004. Tr P. 722, L. 10-20; P. 757, L. 21-25; P.
758, L. 10-22; Trial Exhibit 50. Mr. Ruen's opinions were based on an extensive amount of
historical data derived from numerous maps, aerial photos, and other reports. Tr P. 732, L. 21 P. 733, L. 4; P. 735, L. 4-25.
Mr. Ruen compared Mellick Road as laid out in the viewer's reports, Trial Exhibit 53,
and as actually built because often a road shown on a viewer's report is never actually built. Tr P.
723, L. 1 -P. 725, L. 25. Mr. Ruen testified that in 1957 Mellick Road was not developed
within any of the property owned by Funk and only reached to a point north of the halfway mark
of Section 15. Tr P. 738, L. 1-8. Mr. Ruen testified that Mellick Road did not provide access to
Funk's prope1iy or the tower sites in 1981. Tr P. 746- P. 747, L. 13. Mr. Ruen testified that in
1981 the only road within the property owned by Funk that provided access to the tower sites
was Blossom Mountain Road. Tr P. 754, L. 17-24. Mr. Ruen also testified of the impossibility
of extending Mellick Road through the no1ihern part of the land owned by Funk in Section 15
because of dangerously steep grades. Tr P. 760, L. 1 -P. 761, L. 21. That is why the road as it
exists today turns west into Section 16 (land which was never owned by Funk). Tr P. 760, L. 1 P. 761, L. 21.
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The district court found Mr. Ruen's testimony to be wholly credible and based on his
testimony, and the testimony of others, found that Mellick Road did not reach Funk's portion of
Section 15 in 1975:
After a review of the evidence presented, the court finds that the developed
portion of Mellick Road did not extend to the Funk's real property in Section 15
in 1975. This factual/legal finding is based on the testimony of Darius Ruen, who
was meticulous, precise, and inherently believable. Mr. Ruen's testimony was
buttressed by other witness testimony. The court adopts Mr. Ruen's testimony as
being wholly credible and finds that the facts to which he testified are controlling.
The comi fmiher finds that those facts contradict the testimony of any defense
witnesses as well as any facts testified to by Mr. Lawrence concerning access by
way of Mellick Road.
Aug. RP. 89-90.
Kelvin Brownsberger, the road supervisor for the Post Falls Highway District, testified
that Mellick Road is only maintained by the highway district for approximately 900 feet past
Schilling Loop, nowhere near the property owned by Funk. Tr P. 773, L. 16 - P. 778, L. 8.
The district court also heard substantial and competent evidence from other witnesses that
Mellick Road did not provide access to the tower sites, or even the Funk property in Section 15
at the time of severance. For instance, at deposition Harold Funk testified that the logging road
that Lawrence claimed provided access to Blossom Mountain was in poor shape and was
overgrown. Tr P. 313, L. 2-16. John Mack, Funk's successor in interest, testified by affidavit
that he did not have access to Mellick Road until he performed extensive road building,
removing trees as large as 20 feet tall to build northward toward Mellick Road. Trial Exhibit 54
at ,r,r 9-15. Thomas Loudin, a former resident of the area between 1968 and 1972, testified that
Mellick Road was only maintained to their house and from there it was not possible to take that
road to Blossom Mountain, even by motor bike. Tr P. 342, L. 18

P. 350, L. 25. John Rook

testified than the logging roads through Section 15 were nothing more than a bike/goat trail that
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did not provide access to the tower sites on the mountain. Tr P. 505, L. 1-25. John Bedini, an
engineer that worked for John Rook, testified that he once tried to exit the tower site on Blossom
Mountain by what he thought was an exit on the north face of the mountain but was not able to.
Tr P. 538, L. 3-11; P. 541, L. 8-24. Wesley Hamilton testified that there was no access to the
mountain on the north side in 1981. Tr P. 698, L. 9-23. Robert Hall also testified that there was
no access to Blossom Mountain on the north face of the mountain in 1980. Tr P. 707, L. 20

P.

708, L. 4.
The only testimony presented at trial resembling access to Blossom Mountain via Mellick
Road was testimony of John H. Kinney, a surveyor, who testified that in 1996 and 1997 he was
able to access the mountain from Mellick Road via a road that was east and outside of the
property owned by Funk. Tr P. 401, L. 24

P. 405, L. 12; Trial Exhibit 104. In fact, not only

was this path that Mr. Kinney described outside of the property owned by Funk, it was all private
roadway. Tr P. 435, L. 1-18. Also, Mr. Kinney's testimony did nothing to describe the
conditions in 1975. Therefore, Mr. Kinney's testimony did not support Lawrence's argument
that Funk had access to Blossom Mountain in 1975 through Mellick Road.
The district court was correct in determining that Hall was entitled to an implied
easement across the Lawrence parcel because there was substantial and competent evidence of
reasonable necessity for that easement in 1975. The Court had substantial evidence that there
was no access through Funk's property. The Court also had reliable testimony that developing
the old logging roads through Funk's property was not possible or safe because of the
topography. However, Lawrence wants this Court to conclude that the easement was not
reasonably necessary in 1975 because Funk could have built another access road on the property
he retained. Appellant's Brief at 9.
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For an implied easement all that is required is reasonable necessity and the Lawrences
ask this Court to require something more than that standard. Just as this Court in Davis found
reasonable necessity when prior to severance there was a road that was undeveloped and
unopened, the fact that Funk had overgrown and unusable logging trails in Section 15 does not
preclude a finding of reasonable necessity. Much like the facts of the Davis case, the substantial
and competent evidence in this case is that in 197 5 the only useable access to the tower sites was
the easement road.
Lawrences further argue, citing to this Court's opinion in Capstar III, that Funk's failure
to develop the undeveloped and unopened logging roads in Section 15 prohibits Spectra Site
from establishing reasonable necessity. Appellant's Brief at 9. In Caps tar III this Comi stated
"[ a] property owner cannot create a necessity through his or her own actions." 153 Idaho at 418,
283 P.3d at 735. However, that statement is inapplicable in this analysis because Funk's
reasonable necessity was a result of the severance of title not some prior or later action
destroying or limiting access.
The rule that a prope1iy owner cannot create their own necessity originates from the
Idaho Court of Appeals in Cordwell v. Smith, l 05 Idaho 71, 79-80, 665 P.2d 1081, 1089-90 (Ct.
App. 1983). That case is distinguishable because it involved a claim of implied easement by
necessity, not by prior use. An implied easement by necessity not only requires reasonable
necessity for the easement at the time of severance, but also real present necessity for the
easement. Id. The analysis between the two theories is different and the Comi's suggestion that
Funk created his Ovvn necessity by failing to build an alternate access before severance is
incompatible with an implied easement by prior use. 4

4

To the extent that this section also supports the argument section for easement by necessity and the discussion of
great present necessity, the Cordell case may still apply. However, the point that the necessity was the result of the
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Lawrence has not provided this Court with any authority that would require a grantor to
first develop an alternate access to a portion of his property before he conveys the portion
currently used to access the property to be retained. Instead Lawrence makes wild assumptions
about Mr. Funk's state of mind that are not supported by the record: "Mr. Funk knew he could
access the property from Mellick Road." Appellant's Brief at 10. Requiring a property owner to
first create an alternative access to property to be retained before severing property currently
used for access would be completely contradictory to the rationale of implied easement by prior
use. The reason implied easements by prior use are recognized is because the grantor intends to
retain an easement, but fails to do so. Bird, 147 Idaho at 352, 209 P.3d at 649. If the grantor was
first required to develop alternate access, then there would be no reason to reserve an access
easement. Accordingly, Lawrence's argument that Funk cannot get an implied easement because
he did not develop the logging trails must be rejected.
The district court was correct in finding that Spectra Site had proven Hall's entitlement to
an implied easement across the Lawrence parcel because there was substantial and competent
evidence of reasonable necessity for that easement in 197 5 as well as intent to reserve an
easement at the time of severance.

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SPECTRA SITE
AN INJUNCTION BASED ON HALL'S EASEMENT BY NECESSITY

The Lawrences incorrectly argue that the district court erroneously granted Spectra Site
an easement. The amended final judgment in this case did not grant Spectra Site an easement by
necessity. The district court's analysis was merely a preliminary determination of Hall's right to
an easement, so the court could enforce Spectra Site's rights as a tenant or lessee. The district
court correctly found that Spectra Site proved the facts required to establish an easement by
severance and not Funk's actions still applies and there is still an absence of case law requiring the severing owner
to create an alternative access as discussed further.
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necessity in favor of Hall: "Having proven all of the elements for an easement by necessity,
Spectra Site is awarded an easement by necessity." Aug.RP. 104. The wording in the
memorandum decision and order is not as precise as it could be with regard to the easement and
the fact that an easement was not being granted, but only preliminarily analyzed in connection
with the grant of an injunction. However, the trial court's action clarify it was not granting
Spectra Site an easement. The final judgment is for injm1ctive relief, and there is no grant of
easement or quiet title in the amended final judgment.RP. 38-43. Nevertheless, the district
court's preliminary determination that Hall was entitled to an easement by necessity is supported
by substantial and competent evidence.
The district comi did not err in finding that Hall was entitled to an easement by necessity
because both at the time of severance and now, there is no other access to Spectra Site's parcel
other than the easement road. An easement by necessity is based on either an implied grant or
implied reservation of an easement and based on public policy:
[An easement by necessity] is [of] common-law origin and is supp01ied by the

rule of sound public policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for occupancy
or successful cultivation. Such a way is the result of the application of the
presumption that whenever a party conveys property, he conveys whatever is
necessary for the beneficial use of that property and retains whatever is necessary
for the beneficial use of the land he still possesses. Thus, the legal basis of a way
of necessity is the presumption of a grant arising from the circumstances of the
case. This presumption of a grant, however, is one of fact, and whether a grant
should be implied depends upon the terms of the deed and the facts in each
particular case.

Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71, 79, 665 P.2d 1081, 1089 (1983). To establish an easement by
necessity three elements must be proven: 1) unity of title and subsequent separation of the
dominant and servient estates, 2) reasonable necessity of the easement at the time of severance,
and 3) great present necessity for the easement. }\1achado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho at 219,280 P.3d at
722. The reasonable necessity required for the second element is the same reasonable necessity
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required to establish an implied easement by prior use. Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, 288,
246 P.3d 391, 397 (2010). This Court also required that the claimed easement lead to a public
road, which the trial court interpreted as a new element. Capstar III, 153 Idaho at 419,283 P.3d
at 736. The District Court recognized these four requirements for an easement by necessity and
based on the substantial and competent evidence found that Spectra Site proved all the necessary
elements. Aug.RP. 104.
A.

The District Court's Finding of Unity of Tile and Reasonable Necessity is
Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence

The first two elements for an easement by necessity, unity of title and reasonable
necessity, are the exact same as the elements for an implied easement by prior use and have been
discussed in Section III above. The analysis and argument of Section III above is incorporated
herein by reference.
B.

The District Court's Finding of Great Present Necessity is Supported by
Substantial and Competent Evidence

Hall's great present necessity for the easement road was proven at trial by substantial and
competent evidence. "Great present necessity exists where the claimed easement is the only
access to the claimant's property." Machado, 153 Idaho at 220,280 P.3d 715 at 723. Alternate
access that is inconvenient or expensive is not enough to satisfy the great present necessity
element. Id. Great present necessity exists when the claimant's property is not currently
accessible by a public road. 5 Id.; Capstar III, 153 Idaho at 419,283 P.3d at 736.; MacCaskill v.
Ebbert, 112 Idaho 1115, 1120, 739 P.2d 414,419 (Ct. App. 1987). An easement by necessity
exists only as long the current need exists. Bob Daniels & Sons, 106 Idaho at 542,681 P.2d at
1017.

5

Lawrence incorrectly asserts that "necessity is determined at the time of severance" in their section addressing
great present necessity. Appellant's Brief at 14.
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The substantial and competent evidence presented at trial established the Hall parcel is
cmTently inaccessible by public road. At trial Doug Lawrence testified that the tower sites on
Blossom Mountain, including the Hall parcel, were surrounded by land owned by John Mack. Tr
P. 185, L. 1 P. 186, L. 13. John Mack's affidavit confirms the same:
3. The property I purchased was the last remaining property the Funks owned in
the Southwest Quarter of Section 22. Of the originai 160 acres in Southwest
Quarter of Section 22, one acre was deeded to General Telephone Company of the
Northwest, one acre was deeded to John Rasmussen and Neil Chamberlain, one
acre was deeded to the Kootenai Electric Cooperative, one acre was deeded to
John and Holly Sonneland, and a five acre parcel was deeded to Kootenai
Broadcasting ... The result of this series ofland divisions resulted in 151 acres
remaining in the Southwest Quaiier of Section 22, of which I now own fee simple
title.
Trial Exhibit 54 at 13. Mack's affidavit further described his realization that he did not have
access to his parcel in Section 22 because Idaho Forest Industries, the owner of property in
Section 28, would not give him permission to cross its land via Blossom Mountain Road. Trial
Exhibit 54 at 11 6-8. Because Mack was not allowed to access his property via Blossom
Mountain Road he concluded "The property I owned in Section 22 was completely landlocked
and I had no means oflegal ingress and egress." Trial Exhibit 54 at 19. To provide himself
access to Section 22 Mack built a road through his parcel and other land in the Northwest 1!i of
Section 22 that he bought from Fred Zuber that eventually connected to what Mack called
Mellick Road. Trial Exhibit 54 at 11 10-15. The road that Mack built roughly corresponds to the
portion highlighted in pink on Trial Exhibit 50. Darius Ruen testified that the portion of Exhibit
50 highlighted in pink was road that did not exist until at least 2004, which is consistent with
Mack's affidavit. Tr P. 758, L. 10-22. A portion of the road built by Mack lies outside the
property owned by Funk.
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The Blossom Mountain Estates plat shows the Hall parcel surrounded by private property
without access from any road other than Blossom Mountain Road. Trial Exhibit 40. The fact that
the Hall parcel cannot be accessed from a public road means that it is currently landlocked.
At trial Kelvin Brownsberger, the road supervisor for Post Falls Highway District,
testified that the District only maintains Mellick Road, a public road, to approximately 900 feet
below the old Loudin Place. Tr P. 776, L. 3

P. 778, L. 8. Neither Signal Point Road, nor

Mellick Road, the two closest public roads to the Hall parcel provide access to the parcel.
Despite the substantial evidence that the Hall parcel is currently landlocked without an easement,
the Lawrences contend that there is no great present necessity for an easement because "Spectra
Site has a license agreement with the Lawrences to gain access across the Lawrence prope1iy.
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 86)." Appellant's Brief at 14. This argument lacks merit.

It its special verdict the jury specifically answered "Yes" to the following question: "On
Spectra Site Communications, Inc. 's affirmative defense of breach of contract, did Douglas and
Brenda Lawrence breach the contract by refusing to perform, that is, by denying or refusing to
allow access to Spectra Site as provided in the Access License Agreement?" Aug.RP. 30. To
now argue to this Court that Spectra Site has access by virtue of this access license agreement is
disingenuous and illustrative of the gamesmanship exercised by Lawrences.
Great present necessity exists if the land is not accessible by a public road. Lawrences
have refused to allow Spectra Site to use the road even though it had an access license agreement
giving it that right. The fact remains that the Hall parcel is currently surrounded by private
property and inaccessible by public roads. No license agreement alters that reality as claimed by
Lawrence.
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The district court found: "Presently, there is no other road or easement that provides
access to the Halls' (Spectra Site's) parcel other than the easement road that passes through the
Lawrences' real property in the southeast quarter of Section 21." Aug.RP. 103. His finding is
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Accordingly, Hall and his tenants have a great
present necessity to use the easement road because it has no public access to its parcel.

C.

The District Court's Finding of Access to a Public Road Via the Easement is
Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence

Spectra Site has proved that with an easement over the Lawrence property it can access a
public road. Additionally, the evidence presented at trial of Funk's use of Blossom Mountain
Road would support the conclusion that at the time of severance Funk had access to a public road
based on six years of travel over Blossom Mountain Road.

In Caps tar III this Court stated a requirement that a claimant of an easement by necessity
must be able to reach a public road by the claimed easement:
Nor is it entirely clear how the district court found the easement by necessity over
the Lawrences' land when that easement would not, in fact, lead to a public road.
As the Lawrences point out, Capstar did not have the legal right to travel over the
road in Section 28 and where "land over which the way of necessity is claimed
has no access to a public road," no necessity can arise. Rathbun v. Robson, 203
Mont. 319, 661 P.2d 850, 853 (1983). Therefore, the district comi erred in
determining this issue on summary judgment because the conflicting evidence
presented a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the evidence proved
an easement by necessity.
153 Idaho at 419,283 P.3d at 736. This was never a required element for an easement by
necessity before this Court's adoption of Montana Law in Capstar III According to the
Supreme Court of Montana, which this Court cited in Capstar 111, the claimant of an easement by
necessity must have access to a public road via that easement, otherwise, "the basic reason for
the creation of a way of necessity, namely, to permit communication with the outside world, is
not present." Rathbun v. Robson, 203 Mont. 319, 324, 661 P.2d 850, 853 (1983). Therefore,
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according to this Comi's remarks in Capstar III, Hall and his tenants must have a legal right to
travel over the private road between Signal Point Road and the Lawrence parcel before it can be
granted an easement by necessity.
At trial the district court was presented with substantial and competent evidence of
Spectra Site's right and ability to access Signal Point Road from the Lawrence's parcel. Hall and
his tenants have legal access across the portion of Blossom Mountain Road in the southwest
quarter of Section 21 by vi1iue of an easement obtained by Funk granted by Wilber and Florence
Mead and Ethel Blossom. Trial Exhibit 4; Trial Exhibit WW (Deposition of Harold Funk) P. 44,

L. 10 - P. 45, L. 6. Later in 1997, Nextel West Corp. ("Nextel") entered into an access license
agreement with Idaho Forest Industries, which provided Nextel with legal egress and ingress
across the p01iion of Blossom Mountain Road within Section 28. Trial Exhibit 87. That license
agreement also benefits the successors and assigns of Nextel. Trial Exhibit 87. Spectra Site is
the successor of Nextel. The district court correctly found Spectra Site has legal access over
Section 28, despite the mistaken characterization of the license as an easement. Aug. R 104. The
distinction between a license and an easement makes no difference in the analysis at this point
because all that this Court required in Capstar III was that Spectra Site have a legal right to
travel over the road in Section 28, and this license agreement provides Spectra Site that legal
right.
On appeal Lawrence meshes the great present necessity component with the access to a
public road element. From this meshed approach, Lawrence contends "a license agreement
cannot be used to satisfy the 'access to a public road' element and ignored when considering the
great present necessity element." Appellant's Brief at 14. Lawrence cites no Idaho law to
support this assertion. However, this is not a requirement from the holding in Capstar III.
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Lawrence also suggests that the Capstar III requires that a claimant prove access to a
public road from the easement both presently and at the time of severance. The concern in

Capstar III was whether Capstar had legal access across Section 28, not whether Funk had legal
access across Section 28 after severance of his property by sale to Human Synergistics:
As the Lawrences point out, Capstar did not have the legal right to travel over the
road in Section 28 and where "land over which the way of necessity is claimed
has no access to a public road," no necessity can arise. Rathbun v. Robson, 203
Mont. 319, 661 P.2d 850, 853 (1983). Therefore, the district court erred in
determining this issue on summary judgment because the conflicting evidence
presented a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the evidence proved
an easement by necessity.

Capstar III, 153 Idaho at 419,283 P.3d at 736. there is no requirement under Idaho law that the
grantor at the time of severance have legal access to a public road at the time of severance in
order to establish an easement by necessity at a future date.
If this Court is inclined to require access to a public road via the easement at the time of
necessity, i.e. that Funk had legal access to a public road by way of an easement over Human
Synergistics' property when that property was severed, the facts in the record support that
conclusion. For instance, Funk used Blossom Mountain Road to access his property for six years
before severance. TrP. 310, L. 609; P. 315, L. 1-13; P. 323, L. 11-15. Funk had an easement
across the portion of Blossom Mountain Road that crossed Wilber and Florence Mead and Ethel
Blossom's prope1iy in Section 21. Trial Exhibit 4; Trial Exhibit WW (Deposition of Harold
Funk) P. 44, L. 10 -P. 45, L. 6. Funk's access through Section 28 was based upon a belief that
he had a right to access that land, based on the easement granted to him by Mead and Blossom.
Trial Exhibit WW (Deposition of Harold Funk) P. 70, L. 17

P. 71, L. 23; P. 54, L. 11-25.

There was no evidence presented at trial that Funk's use of the access over Section 28 was
permissive. He accessed his property in Section 22 over Section 28 for 6 years before severance
in 1975. Tr P. 323, L. 1-9; Trial Exhibit WW (Deposition of Harold Funk) P. 25, L. 11-23.
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Funk's successors in title to the Hall parcel continued use of the road through section 28. See
trial testimony of Wes Hamilton, Jim Van Sky and Robert Hall. Although not discussed in the
trial court's ruling, the district court had substantial and competent evidence to conclude that a
Hall had a prescriptive easement vested in the use of Section 28 through the years of use by Hall
and his predecessors. See I.C. 5-203. See also Cramer v. Walker, 23 Idaho 495, 130 P. 1002
(1913) (Holding adverse possession claims ripen into title at the conclusion of the prescriptive
period.)
Spectra Site presented substantial and competent evidence that there was reasonable
necessity at the time of severance and current great present necessity for an easement across
Lawrence's property because there is no public access to Hall's parcel. Spectra Site also proved
that it has legal access to Signal Point Road from the easement road because it has a license
agreement to use Blossom Mountain Road between Signal Point Road and the Lawrence parcel.
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district comi's preliminary determination that an
easement by necessity was established.

V. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THE SCOPE
OF THE EASEMENT
The amended final judgment in this case did not grant Spectra Site an easement by either
prior use or necessity. As a preliminary determination of Hall's easement rights across
Lawrence's property the district court determined that Spectra Site had presented substantial and
competent evidence to support easements by prior use and necessity. As part of that preliminary
determination the district court determined the scope of those easements. These preliminary
determinations were necessary for the district court to enforce Spectra Site's right as Hall's
tenant to use the easement road.
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The district court did not err in determining that Hall's easement across the Lawrence
parcel was for unlimited reasonable use because this scope is consistent with the intent of Harold
Funlc The scope of "an easement granted or reserved in general te;rms, without any limitations as

to its use, is one of unlimited reasonable use." Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho
544, 548, 808 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1991). Easements reserved in general terms are "not restricted
to use merely for such purposes of the dominant estate as are reasonably required at the time of
the grant or reservation, but the right may be exercised by the dominant owner for those purposes
to which that estate may be subsequently devoted." Id. An easement by necessity exists only as
long the current need exists. Bob Daniels & Sons, 106 Idaho at 542, 681 P.2d at 1017.
In this case the district court did not err is determining that easements in favor of Hall
over Lawrence's property would be for unlimited reasonable use because both the implied
easement and the easement by necessity were the result of an easement intended to be reserved in
general terms. As discussed in Section III. A. above, Funk intended to reserve an easement with
general terms corresponding with Blossom Mountain Road. Because the district court correctly
concluded that Spectra Site had met the elements required for the easements from prior use and
necessity based on Funk's intent to reserve a general easement, the scope determined by the
district court was appropriate. The Lawrences' contention on appeal that any easement should
be limited to ingress and egress only for radio tower maintenance ignores the intent to reserve a
general easement found by the district court. The only appropriate restriction on the scope and
extent of the easements in this case would be that the easement by necessity would only exist
until a public road extends to the Hall parcel. However, since an implied easement by prior use
has also been preliminarily determined, a restriction on the easement by necessity would have no
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practical significance. Accordingly, the district court properly determined the scope of the
easements for unlimited reasonable use.
The Lawrences also advanced an argument which referenced an awarded prescriptive
easement, likely confusing their argument for the Capstar appeal with the Spectra Site appeal.
This argument is not persuasive regarding the scope issue in the present case.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above Spectra Site respectfully requests this Court affirm the
district court's Amended Final Judgment.
SUBMITTED this 11th day of January, 2016.
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